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Abstract 
Recent Eurobarometer survey data are used to document and explain the stock of 
social capital in 28 European countries. Social capital in Central and Eastern Europe – 
measured by civic participation and access to social networks – lags behind that in 
Western European countries. Using regression analysis of determinants of individual 
stock of social capital, we find that this gap persists when we account for individual 
characteristics and endowments of respondents but disappears completely after we 
control for aggregate measures of economic development and quality of institutions. 
Informal institutions such as prevalence of corruption in post-communist countries 
appear particularly important. With the enlargement of the European Union, the gap 
in social capital should gradually disappear as the new member states catch up 
(economically and institutionally) with the old ones.  
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1  Introduction 
Over the last decade, the interest in studying social capital has grown enormously 
among sociologists, political scientists and economists alike. While social capital is 
hardly a new concept, it has been greatly popularized by the seminal work of Robert 
Putnam (1993). In his twenty-year long research on the quality of local governments 
in Italy, Putnam identified differences in civic participation (which he proxied, most 
notably, by membership in voluntary organizations) as the source of vast disparities in 
institutional quality and in turn economic performance between the North and South 
of Italy. A plethora of research has followed, and social capital (which, as a general 
term, encompasses Putnam’s civic participation) was found to have important real-life 
repercussions, in particular in economic, social and political development of societies. 
Macroeconomic studies (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Whiteley, 2000 and Beugelsdijk 
and van Schaik, 2005) have found that, in cross-country perspective, higher density of 
trust and/or active membership in organizations is associated with higher growth. 
Offering an historical perspective on the issue, Greif (1994) argues that cultural 
underpinnings of social interactions in medieval societies played a crucial role in 
reducing free riding and opportunistic behavior. These empirical findings cement 
Coleman’s (1988) assertion that social capital, just like other forms of capital, is 
productive and facilitates the attainment of goals that otherwise would not be 
possible. Accordingly, high stock of social capital increases individuals’ ability and 
willingness to cooperate, improves monitoring and enforcement of contracts, reduces 
free-riding and lowers information asymmetry. Social capital therefore lowers 
transaction costs, fosters innovation and dissemination of technology and thus leads to 
better economic outcomes.  
Despite the increasing recognition of the importance of social capital for economic 
outcomes, our understanding of factors that determine the stock of social capital – at 
the individual or aggregate levels – is still very limited. This is a major shortcoming 
(see Glaeser, 2001), because “the dearth of research on determinants of social capital 
has held back its use as a policy tool in economic and social development” 
(Rupasingha et al., 2006: 84). The previous literature is concerned largely with 
measuring the stock of social capital (usually at the aggregate, national level) and its 
change over time and with investigating its impact on the variable of interest 
(typically economic and/or institutional development of countries). Little attention is   3
given to analyzing the factors that determine the individual stock of social capital 
and/or explaining the sources of cross-sectional differences across countries.
1  
This paper therefore constitutes one of the few attempts to bridge the gap between 
theory and empirics. Its contribution is three fold. First, we introduce a new and 
previously unavailable comparative dataset, based on multiple Eurobarometer surveys  
featuring a number of alternative measures of social capital for a sample of 28 
European countries: including the old member countries of the European Union and 
the new member countries. This data set allows us to investigate whether and why 
cross-sectional differences in social capital exist in Europe.  
Second, we take the analysis of the determinants of the individual stock of social 
capital
2 to another level by considering individual and aggregate (country specific) 
factors alike. By using large multi-country data sets of individual respondents, our 
study permits the simultaneous identification of individual-level and societal-level 
determinants of social capital.  
Finally, by focusing on the formation of social capital in the enlarged EU, we aim 
to shed more light on the existing gap in the stock of social capital between the 
developed Western countries and the formerly communist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. As the data we are using were commissioned by the European 
Commission, our analysis is necessarily constrained to include only the old and the 
new member countries of the EU. Though there has been some research studying 
social capital in post-communist countries separately (see Paldam and Svendsen, 
2000; Adam et al., 2004), to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to 
systematically develop and jointly analyze the formation of social capital in both 
developed and transition countries.
 3 We construct measures applicable to both groups 
of countries and analyze them in a unified framework. We then discuss our findings 
specifically in the context of the enlargement process.  
                                                 
1  Furthermore, that work is largely theoretical in its nature (see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Glaeser 
et al., 2002). Empirical attempts, on the other hand, are fairly recent and tend to focus primarily on 
social capital in one country (see Glaeser et al., 2002 for evidence in the United States and Groot et al., 
2007 for evidence on the Netherlands). For a recent extensive overview of social capital literature, see 
Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004).  
2   We employ the same definition as in the micro-economic literature, according to which individual 
social capital consists of one’s social attributes that can be beneficial while interacting with other 
individuals. For a detailed discussion, see Glaeser et al. (2002).  
3   With the exception of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, all new member countries are former communist 
countries. This shared legacy of communism and central planning is one of their main distinguishing 
features in comparison to the old member countries of the EU. Therefore, the on-going post-communist 
transition process is an important aspect of our analysis.    4
In the previous literature on enlargement or, more generally, the process of 
transition from communism to democracy and market economy, the focus has been on 
real and nominal convergence and convergence in formal institutions (i.e., laws and 
regulations). Informal institutions (i.e., norms, relationships, and rules of behavior) 
have not received much attention. In this paper, we draw guidance from recent 
developments in the new institutional economics. That literature stresses the 
importance of informal institutions and their role in explaining differences across 
developed and less developed (both developing and transition) countries (see North, 
1990; Feige, 1997). Given that the formerly communist countries are still going 
through transformation, involving tremendous institutional restructuring, it is very 
important that informal institutions develop in parallel to formal institutions, so that 
the two remain compatible. If this happens, the transaction costs of such institutional 
restructuring, expressed in the form of predatory activities such as corruption and tax 
evasion, will decrease (see Pejovich, 2003). On the other hand, if formal and informal 
institutions are in conflict with each other, more of such predatory activities may be 
expected, as shown empirically by Gërxhani (2004).  
Our analysis confirms the existence of a gap in social capital between Western and 
Eastern European countries. However, our findings suggest that this gap reflects the 
lower level of economic development and the lower quality of institutions in the latter 
countries. As such, it should gradually disappear as the post-communist countries 
catch up with respect to both their economic development and the quality of 
institutions. We also discuss, albeit very tentatively, the potential impact that EU 
enlargement can have on intra-European convergence in social capital levels.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the previous literature 
about social capital and its measurement. Section 3 introduces our data and explains 
the measures that we use. Section 4 provides empirical insights on the individual 
determinants of social capital. Section 5 completes the analysis by integrating 
individual and aggregate factors. Section 6 concludes.  
   5
2  Social capital and its measurement 
2.1 What is social capital? 
As a consequence of the variety of aspects it thought to embody, social capital has 
been defined in various ways. Although the concept itself originates from Loury 
(1977) and later Bourdieu (1986), Coleman’s (1988) definition has become especially 
popular. Coleman, presenting a sociologist’s view, defines social capital as a 
component of human capital that allows members of a given society to trust one 
another and cooperate in the formation of new groups and associations. Putnam 
(1993: 664-665), a political scientist, offers a broader definition of social capital as 
encompassing “features of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that enable 
participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared interests”. Stiglitz 
(2000), an economist, sees social capital – which he delineates as encompassing tacit 
knowledge, networks and reputation – as a social means to tackle moral hazard and 
incentive issues. Broadly speaking, all these definitions refer to trust, cooperative 
behavior and networks between groups, as essential components of social capital 
(Knack and Keefer, 1997). In the presence of trust, cooperation is easier and therefore 
the frequency and density of networks is expected to be higher.
4 Interaction through 
networks in turn enhances trust and cooperative ability. According to Dasgupta 
(1988), social capital can make economic transactions more efficient by expanding 
the parties’ access to information, enabling them to coordinate activities for mutual 
benefit and reducing opportunistic behavior through repeated transactions. In 
addition, Putnam (1993) argues that participation in civic associations can contribute 
to the effectiveness and stability of democratic governments, both because of their 
‘internal’ effects on individual members and because of their ‘external’ effects on the 
wider polity. “Internally, associations instill in their members habits of cooperation, 
solidarity, and public-spiritedness. Externally, ‘interest articulation’ and ‘interest 
aggregation’ are enhanced by a dense network of secondary associations” (Putnam, 
1993: 89-90). All in all, these studies are fundamentally based on the assumption that 
                                                 
4   The direction of causality is not clearly resolved, however. Gambetta (1990), for example, argues 
that trust follows rather than causes cooperation.   6
social capital is one of the the primary forces, which shapes social and economic 
development.
5  
There is however theoretical (see Lipset, 1959; Flanagan, 1987; Inglehart, 1997) 
and empirical (see Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Paugam and Russell, 2000; O’Connell, 
2003; Casey and Christ, 2005) research that either questions the validity of such an 
assumption or substantiates the opposite direction of causality. In other words, these 
studies argue that social capital may mediate economic development but not 
determine it, or that social capital is in fact determined by economic outcomes. 
Focusing particularly on one aspect of social capital – civic involvement in 
associations – sociologists and political scientists have found that the higher the GDP 
per capita, the higher the level of education and as a consequence wealth, and 
therefore the easier the shift toward the ‘post-materialist’ values of well-being, 
tolerance, and trust – values which in turn support the development of associations 
(see Inglehart, 1990; 1997). The relationship between social capital (measured as 
membership in organizations) and democracy has also been researched. Discussions 
(mainly theoretical) on this relationship are also split around the issue of causality. In 
a fairly recent empirical study, however, Paxton (2002) finds that the relationship 
between social capital and democracy is reciprocal so that they simultaneously affect 
each other.  
Obviously, whether social capital affects social, political and economic 
development or the other way around or whether the relationship is simultaneous 
remains a controversial issue. Because of the popularity of the concept emerging from 
the focus on the effect of social capital on societal development, in spite of some 
studies (as mentioned above) the reverse effect is however under-researched. In order 
to better understand the development of nations, more research is needed on the 
determinants of social capital. Agreeing with social psychologists, Greif (1994) 
argues that the level of development and the organization of an economy may 
determine whether societies develop ‘collectivist’ or ‘individualist’ characteristics. 
The former tend to build up group-specific social capital (i.e., pertaining to one’s 
family, religious or ethnic group) and rely on informal enforcement, whereas the latter 
                                                 
5    Nevertheless, it is now widely recognized that social capital may also have less desirable 
consequences. For an extensive discussion, see Portes (1998).    7
are based on interaction across groups that invest in generalized social capital and 
formal enforcement rules.
6  
At a first instant, an analogy can be observed between Greif’s categorization of 
societies and the two groups of countries analyzed in this paper. The old member 
states of the EU (with most of them being highly developed countries) are generally 
characterized by a high density of economic transactions among groups, well-
established institutions, high level of generalized trust, high participation in civil 
associations and a bottom-up structure of economic transactions. Correspondingly, 
they would seem to fall into the category of individualist societies. New member 
countries (predominantly less developed countries), on the other hand, feature 
relatively large underground economy, greater extent of corruption and state failure, 
low levels of generalized trust and participation in civil associations and a top-down 
structure of economic transactions. Hence, they come close to Greif’s description of 
collectivist societies. Moreover, with the exception of Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, the 
new member countries are all post-communist societies. Research on social capital in 
these countries has put forward a so-called dictatorship theory of missing social 
capital (see Raiser, 1999; Kunioka and Woller, 1999; and Paldam and Svedsen, 2000, 
2001). According to this theory, dictatorships destroy social capital, group-specific 
and generalized alike. Moreover, they create conditions whereby, when dictatorships 
collapse, societies may even accumulate ‘negative’ social capital, which in turn 
impedes economic growth. During the transition period in most of the new member 
countries, ‘positive’ social capital has seemingly dissipated and ‘negative’ social 
capital, taking the form of underground activities, corruption and organized crime, has 
become more prominent. The gap, created by the sudden destruction of old 
institutions and the creation of new ones, provided a favorable environment for the 
persistence or even further accumulation of ‘negative’ social capital throughout 
transition.
7 The dictatorship theory of destroyed social capital thus adds a new 
dimension to Greif’s categorization. Within the so-called collectivist societies, there 
                                                 
6   Svendsen and Svendsen (2004) use notions of ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital, respectively, 
to describe what we call group-specific and generalized social capital. The ‘bridging’ social capital is 
the beneficial one because it captures “open networks that are outward looking and encompass people 
across diverse social cleavages.” (p. 2)  
7   The extent to which this ‘negative’ social capital (i.e., underground activities or corruption) has 
emerged varies per country. Rose (2000) relates it to the supremacy of the totalitarian regime these 
countries experienced during communism. The same line of argument can be found in Putnam et al. 
(1993), where the low level of social capital in South Italy is attributed to the long absolutist regime of 
the Kingdom of Sicily.     8
are countries which due to the legacy of communism may possess neither generalized 
nor group-specific social capital, and may even have an inherited stock of ‘negative’ 
social capital.
8  
These characteristics of post-communist countries provide another evidence of 
the causation running from democracy to social capital. “Given the totalitarian 
tendencies of state socialist systems, an autonomous civil society rarely emerges in a 
bottom-up fashion, except when the regime is in serious crisis. Instead, its emergence 
is often the result of top-down efforts, that is through tolerance, encouragement, or 
sponsorship by state policies (Tong, 1994: 334). 
 
2.2 Measurement of social capital 
9 
The literature tends to attach the label social capital quite liberally to a number of 
concepts that are not necessarily equivalent to each other. The following are the most 
popular empirical measures of generalized social capital:  
 
1  Civic participation, generally captured by membership in voluntary 
organizations, was pioneered by Putnam’s (1993) seminal work on Italian 
regions. Through membership in voluntary organizations, one learns to interact 
with other people – both acquaintances and strangers – in a cooperative 
manner and to solicit their cooperation to achieve a shared objective.
10 As 
such, voluntary organizations introduce their members to advantages and 
practice of collective action (Olson, 1982). Later work further distinguishes 
between Putnamesque and Olsonian organizations (see Knack and Keefer, 
1997). The former, such as educational, sport and art clubs, religious and 
charitable organizations and youth groups, allow their members to build up 
social capital and pursue common goals without imposing negative 
externalities on the rest of the society. The latter, including political parties and 
movements, trade unions, professional associations, and various interest 
groups, tend to engage in collective action that may reconfigure redistribution 
                                                 
8   Needless to say, given the main argument in the literature that the generalized social capital is more 
beneficial to a society as a whole in the long run, the focus of this paper is on this type of social capital. 
9   For a critical review of empirical analysis of social capital, see Durlauf (2002).  
10   For instance, participating in team sports or playing an instrument in an orchestra requires an 
extraordinary degree of cooperation, coordination and discipline. The fans of The Simpsons television 
series may recall Lisa Simpson’s unsuccessful attempt at individualism when playing the saxophone in 
a school orchestra, which illustrates this point rather well.    9
systems in their favor at the expense of the rest of the society. Therefore, in 
contrast to Putnamesque groups, which are thought to play a positive role in 
the society, the impact of Olsonian groups may be distinctly negative.  
2  Trust, popularized by Fukuyama (1995), is the most commonly used empirical 
measure of social capital. Its empirical popularity is largely due to the 
availability of extensive cross-country survey data on generalized trust 
(collected within the framework of the World Value Surveys program). 
Typically, trust is defined as the extent to which people find strangers 
trustworthy.  
3  Density of networks is a measure of ties between individuals. Network-based 
ties can be formal or informal. In formal networks, ties between individuals 
take the form of joint presence at a formal event or membership in an 
organization. Alumni associations are an example of formal networks which 
may partially overlap with membership in voluntary organizations. Informal 
networks, on the other hand, embody informal relations among friends, 
members of (extended) family, colleagues and the like. As argued in Paxton 
(1999), while informal networks are primarily based on ties between 
individuals, formal networks go beyond that by accessing and creating 
additional group-level benefits.  
4  Philanthropic generosity (i.e. altruism). This measure is based on Putnam’s 
(2001) finding that the frequency of charitable contributions in the US over 
time has been highly correlated with membership in voluntary organizations.  
 
The following section provides a description of the data and methodology used, and 
explains how social capital is operationalized in this paper.  
 
3  Social capital in Europe 
Our measures of social capital utilize several recent Eurobarometer surveys 
commissioned by the European Commission and carried out by Gallup Europe.
11 Two 
types of surveys are used. First, the standard Eurobarometer surveys (henceforth EB) 
were carried out in the 15 countries that were members of the European Union at the 
                                                 
11  We are grateful to Robert Manchin of The Gallup Organisation Europe for kindly making these 
data available to us.   10
time.
12 Second, as of 2000, similar surveys were carried out also in the new member 
countries.
13 As the new members were still candidates for EU membership at that 
time, these surveys were referred to as Candidate Countries Eurobarometers 
(henceforth CCEB). The two types of surveys were implemented using essentially the 
same methodology and frequently contained similar or identical questions.
14 
Importantly, three recent EB surveys (in 1998, 1999 and 2001) featured questions that 
address various aspect of social capital and identical questions were included in the 
Spring 2002 CCEB survey. We can therefore carry out comparative analysis with 
both sets of countries. In particular, the EB/CCEB surveys featured questions that we 
use to gauge three aspects of social capital: civic participation, access to social 
networks, and altruism (philanthropic generosity). These three components capture 
both quantitative and qualitative dimensions of social capital, since the first and, to 
some extent, the second aspect indicate objective associations or ties between 
individuals, while the last together with parts of the second reflect the subjectivity 
within a tie (e.g., altruism).
15 Table 1 presents the aggregate figures.  
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
The first measure in Table 1 is the average civic participation, measured as active 
membership in voluntary organizations. Specifically, the respondents were asked: 
“From the following list, could you tell me in which of these organizations do you 
actively participate?”. The list of organizations included charities (social, communal 
or religious); religious or parish organizations other than charities; cultural or artistic 
organizations; trade unions or political parties; human rights movements or 
organizations; organizations for the protections of nature, animals and the 
                                                 
12   Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  
13  Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey. Except Turkey, all of these countries have become members of the EU 
as of May 2004. 
14   See WZB (2003). The surveys are carried out by means of face-to-face interviews, with 
approximately 1,000 respondents per country, except the following countries: Germany (1,000 
respondents in each West and East Germany), United Kingdom (additional 300 respondents in 
Northern Ireland), Poland and Turkey (2,000 respondents each), and Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta 
(500 respondents each). The overall sample size thus is approximately 16,000 for the EB surveys and 
14,000 for the CCEB. The same questionnaire is used in all countries of the respective group (EB or 
CCEB), the questionnaire is translated and interviewers are local staff. The surveys are constructed so 
as to be broadly representative at the national level. The data report East Germany and Northern Ireland 
as separate entities, and we retain this distinction.  
15   For a detailed discussion, see Paxton (1999).   11
environment; youth organizations such as scouts or youth clubs; consumer 
organizations; sports clubs and associations; hobby clubs; and other clubs or 
organizations. It should be stressed that the question asks the respondents to list those 
organizations in which they actively participate. We believe that active participation is 
crucial for the link between membership in voluntary organizations and social capital: 
one builds up social capital through interacting with fellow members and participating 
in common activities, not by paying membership dues or holding a membership 
card.
16 Unfortunately, the question only records each type of organization, thereby 
disregarding multiple memberships in similar organizations (for example, one may be 
a member of two or three different sports clubs). As the survey asked about 
membership in 11 types of organizations (including an ‘other’ category), the 
maximum value that this variable can attain is 11. To be consistent with the literature 
(see section 2.2), we split the membership count into Putnamesque and Olsonian 
variables in the adjacent columns. No question on trust was included in the 
Eurobarometer surveys. For comparative purposes, the last two columns of the first 
part of Table 1 report country averages of level of generalized trust as measured by 
the two most recent rounds of the World Value Surveys: 1990 and 1996. Specifically, 
the figures measure the fraction of respondents who declared that most people could 
be trusted when asked “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be 
trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?”. This is, however, not 
a measure used in our analysis.
17’
18 
The first three columns of the second part of Table 1 measure the presence of 
social networks that one can rely on in need. Specifically, respondents were asked: “If 
you had any of the following problems (you were feeling depressed; you needed help 
finding a job for yourself or a member of your family; or you needed to borrow money 
                                                 
16 An implication of this definition is that being a member of a religion and attending religious services 
is not regarded as social capital, unless one actively participates in religious or parish organizations. 
Applying a more liberal definition would result in artificially high levels of social capital for countries 
with high identification with a dominant religion (e.g. the Roman-Catholic church in Poland or Italy) . 
17   Some argue that generalized trust is not an adequate measure of social capital, because it does not 
differentiate between trust and trustworthiness (see Bornhorst et al., 2004), and because it is context-
dependent. For example, in an ethnically polarized society, a member of the minority group – even if 
perfectly trustworthy- will often neither be trusted by the majority of population nor him(her)self trust 
the members of the majority. In addition, the same individual would report considerably different 
generalized trust depending on the wording (or understanding) of the question: he or she would report 
high trust vis-à-vis members of own group but low trust vis-à-vis members of the majority group.  
18  Glaeser et al. (2000) provide a fine combination of experimental and field data to measure both 
concepts of trust and trustworthiness. For an interesting theoretical study of trustworthiness, as 
corresponding to a non-incentive based type of social capital, see Francois and Zabojnik (2005).    12
to pay an urgent bill, like electricity, gas, rent or mortgage) is there anyone you could 
rely on to help you, from outside your own household?”. As these three networks are 
rather different in nature, we codify each as a separate binary variable equal to 1 if the 
individual has access to the network in question and 0 otherwise.  
The last two columns of the second part of the table report the average extent of 
altruism among the respondents, based on the following two questions: “Now thinking 
about poor or socially excluded people, in the last twelve months, have you done the 
following (given money or goods to poor or socially excluded people; given up some 
of your time to help poor or socially excluded people) at least once a month, less often 
or have you not done it?”. The answers are coded as 0 for those who never 
contributed money or given up their time, 1 for those who did so less than once a 
month, and 2 for those who did so more often.  
The figures for each measure of social capital are presented in descending order. 
The average figures for the old EU members and the new member countries are also 
included. There are clear similarities in the ordering of countries. Whether the various 
indicators measure the same underlying phenomenon (i.e., social capital) or not can 
be assessed by means of simple correlation analysis. Table 2 presents the correlation 
matrix for the various measures at the aggregate level. Clearly, civic participation is 
very closely correlated with aggregate generalized trust: the correlation coefficients 
between trust and average participation, Putnamesque and Olsonian groups are all 
close to 0.8. The correlation analysis further suggests that Putnamesque and Olsonian 
groups are not necessarily that different: countries with high participation in one 
group also display high levels of participation in the other. Similarly, both groups are 
closely correlated with generalized trust. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, 
we maintain the distinction between Putnamesque and Olsonian groups in the 
remainder of our analysis.  
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Countries where social networks are more prevalent tend to display also high 
levels of civic participation. A similarly high degree of correlation holds between 
networks and generalized trust. The only indicator that stands out as largely 
orthogonal to either civic participation or generalized trust is altruism. In contrast to   13
Putnam’s (2001) finding, our data find both measures of philanthropic generosity 
being at best weakly correlated with the remaining variables.  
Finally, based on Table 1, two observations can be made about the distribution of 
social capital across countries. First, of all the indicators listed in Table 1 except 
giving up one’s time to help the poor and socially excluded, all show the old member 
countries as having on average higher stock of social capital than the new member 
countries. Given that the vast majority of the new EU members are post-communist 
countries, this observation seems to confirm the assertion of Paldam and Svendsen 
(2000, 2001) and Adam et al. (2004) that communism destroyed social capital by 
discouraging social interactions outside one’s immediate network of friends and 
family. Second, there is a considerable degree of variation within both groups of 
countries – some new member countries have very favorable endowments of social 
capital whereas some old member countries fare rather poorly. A detailed analysis is 
provided in the following sections. 
 
4  Individual determinants of social capital 
In section 2, we described three types of indicators – civic participation, social 
networks, and altruism – that, as argued in the literature, measure the stock of social 
capital (or its various aspects). Based on our data, we showed that at the aggregate 
level, civic participation and social networks are indeed closely correlated with each 
other as well as with generalized trust, whereas correlation is at best weak vis-à-vis 
altruism. The high correlation of our measures of civic participation and networks 
with generalized trust – the variable used most frequently to study social capital – 
makes us confident about using these two measures to analyze factors that determine 
individual stock of social capital.  
We view social capital as a productive asset that is built up through investment: it 
takes time, effort and often a financial outlay to accumulate social capital. Once built 
up, as with other types of capital (physical and human), social capital generates a 
return, depreciates over time and needs to be kept up to prevent it from depreciating 
and becoming obsolete. An individual’s investment in social capital therefore should 
depend on the individual’s socio-economic characteristics, in particular age, family 
background, level of human capital (education and occupation), and income (see 
Coleman, 1988). While our approach in this paper is purely empirical, this notion of   14
social capital can be supported by standard economic theory, as is done by Glaeser et 
al. (2002), whereby the individual’s stock of social capital is the outcome of an 
individual maximization problem with limited resources. In addition, in line with our 
discussion in section 2, we also consider aggregate determinants of social capital such 
as economic development and quality of institutions. The former (e.g. income level 
and income equality) may help create more cohesive, legitimate societies and hence 
encourage the formation of social capital (Inglehart, 1990; Wilkinson, 1996). The 
latter (e.g. the rule of law or institutional transparency, and stability or continuity of 
democracy) are likely to affect the return to investment in any type of capital, 
including the social one. In more transparent and less corrupted societies, individuals 
are more willing to engage in civic activities (O’Connell, 2003). According to Paldam 
(2002), corruption is by far the best available measure of ‘negative’ social capital. 
Democracy is also an important factor influencing not only civic engagement but also 
voluntary membership in associations (Curtis et al., 2001; Schofer and Fourcade-
Gourinchas, 2001). Therefore, individuals in countries with less transparent and less 
democratic institutions may be discouraged from investing and, in turn, will acquire 
less generalized social capital than their counterparts in countries with better 
institutional environment.  
The dependent variables are two of the measures introduced in section 3: civic 
participation, and social networks.
19 As very few individuals participate in more than 
3 organizations, we recoded civic participation so that it takes values 0, 1, 2, or 3, 
with the last being ascribed to anyone who participates in three or more organizations. 
The participation in Putnameque and Olsonian groups was recoded in the same way. 
Social networks remain defined as above: zero-one dummy variables indicating 
having access to the respective network.  
As a first step, we relate the individual stock of social capital to various 
individual-level socio-demographic characteristics: gender, age, marital status, 
education, occupation, residency in urban vs. rural areas and income. Based on 
previous research, we should expect that social capital is higher among older people 
(Putnam, 1995) or follows a life-cycle pattern (Glaeser et al., 2000); married 
                                                 
19   Despite the low correlation of altruism with either civic participation or social networks, using the 
two measures of helping the poor and socially excluded yields results broadly similar to those obtained 
with civic participation and social networks. Because of both space considerations and the slightly 
lower confidence that we have in this measure being indicative of the stock of social capital, the results 
obtained with altruism are not reported here. They can be obtained from the authors upon request.    15
individuals have a slightly higher stock of social capital (Putnam, 1995); education is 
positively correlated with social capital (Helliwell and Putnam, 1999; Glaeser et al., 
2002); entrepreneurship (self-employment) contributes to a higher stock of social 
capital (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2004); residency in urban areas translates into lower 
social capital; and income is positively correlated with investment in social capital 
(Rupasingha et al., 2006). To account for country-specific factors, we also include 
country dummies (East Germany and Northern Ireland are reported as separate 
entities in the EB data sets; because of the potentially special nature of these two 
regions and we maintain this distinction). Table 3 reports the regression results 
obtained with civic participation for the new member countries
20, while Table 4 
presents those for the old member states. Because of the potentially important 
difference between Putnamesque and Olsonian groups, we carry out the regression 
analysis first with overall participation and then separate it into the two types of 
voluntary organizations. Table 5 similarly reports the results of regressions with 
access to social networks for the new member states while Table 6 reports analogous 
results for the old member states of the European Union.  
 
TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE 
 
Looking first at the overall civic participation, a number of individual 
characteristics appear to shape individual investment in social capital. These 
determinants confirm the main findings of previous research. Importantly, the 
determinants of social capital appear similar in the old and the new member countries 
of the EU.  
 
TABLES 5 AND 6 HERE 
 
Most of our findings show not only consistency across the two measures of social 
capital but also that the determinants of social capital in the old and the new member 
countries are in fact very similar. The main exception is the age profile of social 
                                                 
20   Turkey is not included in our analysis for two reasons. First, due to its unclear status with respect to 
membership in the EU. Second, because it differs from the other new member countries in many 
important aspects such as the level of development, and cultural and religious traditions Nonetheless, 
including Turkey in the regressions or omitting also Cyprus and Malta (which do not share the post-
communist legacy characteristic of the other new member countries) produce qualitatively very similar 
results and are therefore not reported here but can be obtained upon request.    16
capital: civic participation tends to increase with age (possibly following a hump-
shaped pattern) whereas access to social networks falls with age. Furthermore, being 
self-employed is associated with higher civic participation in the new members but 
not in the old member countries, although in both sets of countries the self-employed 
appear to have better access to social networks. The remaining variables affect civic 
participation and social networks similarly: higher education, higher income, being a 
student and being a white-collar worker are all positively correlated with social 
capital. Being unemployed, on the other hand, translates into lower social capital.  
When comparing participation in Putnamesque and Olsonian groups, only a few 
differences emerge. Education and income are positively correlated with active 
participation in both types of groups. The age profile of social capital over one’s 
lifetime is more pronounced and steeper for Olsonian groups – participation in 
collective action aimed at distributive objectives increases and subsequently falls 
more dramatically with age than participation in Putnamesque groups. The 
unemployed, retirees, house-persons and females, on the other hand, tend to stay away 
from Olsonian groups but do participate in Putnamesque ones – they pursue their 
interests and hobbies but not distributional objectives. Married people are less likely 
to participate in Putnamesque groups but more likely to get organized in Olsonian 
ones. The self-employed and white-collar workers, finally, tend to participate more 
often in Putnamesque rather than in Olsonian groups.
21  
The positive relationship between education and the stock of social capital 
suggests that social and human capital are complementary – individuals who acquire a 
high stock of one also invest in the other.
22 In addition, education may reduce the cost 
of investing in social capital by improving one’s communication skills, increasing 
social interaction and networking, or by generating positive externalities (Helliwell 
and Putnam, 1999; Rupasingha et al., 2006). The positive effect of income confirms 
the existing empirical findings but contradicts the theoretical predictions that 
investment in social capital should fall with opportunity cost of time (wage) (Glaeser 
et al. (2002). This finding could be reconciled by recognizing that obtaining social 
capital may require not only time but also monetary outlays. Furthermore, this result 
can be indicative of reverse causality. As income is contemporaneous to social capital 
                                                 
21   This finding confirms the argument provided by Svendsen and Svendsen (2004: 3), that 
“entrepreneurship [ ] facilitates voluntary collective action and the creation of inclusive types of social 
capital”, thus higher participation in the Putnamesque organizations. 
22   For an early evidence and discussion, see Coleman (1988).   17
(unlike education which is typically acquired at a relatively young age), finding 
positive correlation between income and social capital may also be due to the positive 
impact of social capital on earnings.
23 The negative relationship between being 
unemployed, retirees, house-persons or female on the stock of social capital may 
reflect their exclusion from the labor market. These groups of individuals, especially 
females, are expected to have a higher stock of group-specific social capital than the 
generalized one (see Stoloff et al., 1999; and WB, 2002).  
Since the individual determinants of social capital are to a large extent very 
similar in the old and the new member countries of the EU, we hypothesize that 
country-specific factors play an important role in accounting for the apparent gap (cf. 
section 3), as insinuated by the high and significant country dummies in tables 3-6. In 
the next section, we consider aggregate determinants of social capital.  
 
5  Economic development and institutional quality 
In this section, we extend the analysis of determinants of individual stock of social 
capital by considering, alongside individual characteristics, aggregate factors such as 
economic development and the quality of institutions. In doing so, we hope to gain 
additional insights into the factors that underlie the formation of social capital at the 
individual level. Moreover, country-specific economic and institutional conditions 
may help account for the gap in the level of social capital between the old and the new 
member states of the EU.  
As we want to explain the differences in the formation of social capital across 
countries, we merge the data for both old and new member countries of the EU and 
include a dummy variable for the new members (while dropping the country 
dummies). Obtaining a significant coefficient on the ‘new members’ dummy would 
                                                 
23  As a consequence of possible endogeneity in social capital, the coefficients estimated for income 
may be biased. While we lack suitable instruments for income to remedy this potential endogeneity 
bias, we re-estimated all regressions while omitting the income variable. The results for the other 
variables remain essentially the same, regardless of whether income is included or not: even if the 
coefficient for income is biased, this apparently does not affect the remaining coefficients. Importantly, 
our analysis is not affected by another type of endogeneity that is likely in aggregate-level studies: 
social capital determining economic outcomes such as economic growth or the level of economic 
development (see Durlauf, 2002). This is because our analysis is based on individual data. While 
economic outcomes are likely to be endogenous in aggregate (country-level) social capital only, each 
individual respondent is too small for her social capital to have an impact on aggregate economic 
outcomes.   18
indicate that there is indeed a gap between the old and the new members that cannot 
be explained by the variables included in the regression. 
At first, we run the regressions only with individual characteristics. These results 
are reported in Table 7, again for civic participation (overall active participation in 
voluntary organization as well as participation in Putnamesque and Olsonian groups), 
and for access to social networks. The impact of individual characteristics mirrors our 
previous findings: age, education, income, occupation and employment status are all 
important determinants of the individual stock of social capital (note, however, that in 
this merged data set the self-employed now display significantly lower civic 
participation whereas before the self-employed dummy appeared with positive 
coefficient for the new member countries and insignificant or marginally significant 
negative coefficient for the old member countries). 
The results of the first regression, with overall civic participation, confirm the 
observation (based on country averages reported in Table 1) that the new members lag 
significantly behind the old member countries in their stock of social capital: the 
coefficient on the new members dummy is negative and strongly significant. When 
distinguishing between Putnamesque and Olsonian groups, an interesting result 
appears: the new member countries do better than old member countries with respect 
to participation in Putnamesque groups, but do worse for Olsonian groups. The 
coefficient estimate, however, is much lower (in absolute value) for the former than 
for the latter. Hence, when the two types of groups are pooled together in ‘overall 
civic participation’, the lower participation in Olsonian groups more than offsets the 
effect of higher participation in Putnamesque ones and the new member countries thus 
appear to lag behind the old member countries. This result is particularly interesting 
because it cannot be readily discerned from the country averages in Table 1; in that 
table, new member countries appear to lag behind with respect to both Olsonian and 
Putnamesque groups. It is only after accounting for individual characteristics that this 
striking difference becomes apparent.  
As we will see later, when accounting for institutional factors, this finding seems 
to reflect a general dissatisfaction with, and lack of trust in, formal institutions in the 
new member countries. This dissatisfaction is particularly strong with respect to the 
Olsonian groups such as political parties and unions. This has its roots in communism 
(common to all new member countries except Cyprus and Malta) when political   19
activity was not voluntary, trade unions were highly politicized and subordinated to 
the communist party and civil society emerged in a bottom-up fashion (Tong, 1994).  
The gap in social capital also appears when considering access to social networks: 
across all three sub-measures, the new members appear to lag significantly behind the 
old member countries of the EU.  
 
TABLE 7 HERE 
 
To assess the impact of country-level economic and institutional environment, we 
augmented the regressions with a number of aggregate indicators of economic 
development and institutional quality: GDP per capita (in purchasing-power-parity 
terms), the Gini coefficient of income inequality, the Transparency International 
corruption-perception index (inverted so that higher values indicate lower corruption),  
the average of indexes of political freedom and civil liberties reported by the Freedom 
House (in alternative regression specifications, we replaced this democracy index 
with a measure of the fraction of years since 1972 that the country was classified by 
the Freedom House as free or partially free), economic freedom index compiled by 
the Frasier Institute, and the average economic growth over the preceding three years. 
Though we tried several alternative regression specifications
24, the results are broadly 
similar and therefore we report, in Table 8, only one of the most general regression 
specifications, relating individual stock of social capital to economic development 
(proxied by per-capita GDP), income inequality, pervasiveness of corruption and 
economic freedom.
25  
 
TABLE 8 HERE 
 
The most interesting finding is that once aggregate economic development and 
institutional quality are controlled for, the new member countries seem no longer to 
be different from the old members with respect to their stock of social capital. 
Moreover, the new member countries appear with a positive coefficient in the first 
three regressions, indicating that the new members display significantly higher active 
participation in voluntary organizations, Putnamesque and Olsonian alike, than one 
                                                 
24   Additional results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
25  Note that we adjusted the standard errors for the fact that aggregate and individual variables are 
measured at different levels of aggregation.    20
would expect given their level of economic development and institutional quality. In 
fact, already when controlling only for GDP per capita, the significance of the new 
members dummy is driven below conventional levels, or the dummy appears 
significantly positive, in all six regressions (specifically, the dummy appears with a 
significantly positive coefficient in the regression with Putnamesque groups and not 
significant otherwise).  
The impact of country-specific economic and institutional conditions is in line 
with previous research. Higher per-capita income tends to be associated with more 
frequent civic participation, although the pattern often appears not significant when 
additional aggregate indicators are included in the regression (as is the case in the 
regressions reported in Table 8). Individuals in countries with high income inequality 
and especially widely-spread corruption (the strongest significant variable) tend to 
acquire less social capital. Economic freedom seems to encourage investment into 
social capital.  
These patterns are very intuitive. Income inequality reflects the intensity of social 
conflict or polarization in a country (see Knack and Keefer, 1997; Rodrik, 1999; 
Rupasingha et al., 2006). Socially polarized countries, not surprisingly, end up with 
lower investment in generalized social capital. Rampant corruption and extensive 
regulation of the economy reduce the returns on any kind of investment, whether it is 
in social capital or other productive capacities. Therefore, both formal and informal 
institutions (economic freedom belonging to the former, while corruption being an 
expression of the latter) matter for individual acquisition of generalized social capital.  
Finally, it is reassuring to note that the individual socio-demographic attributes 
(education, occupation, unemployment and income) remain strongly significant after 
controlling for aggregate determinants of social capital. Hence, both individual and 
aggregate factors play important roles in underlying individual decisions on acquiring 
social capital.  
 
6  Conclusion 
Using recent Eurobarometer surveys, this paper presents new and previously 
unavailable comparative data featuring a number of alternative measures of social 
capital for a sample of 28 European countries: including the old member countries of 
the European Union and countries that since 2004 have joined the EU as new   21
members (mainly Central and Eastern European countries). Focusing on civic 
participation and access to social networks as two key (quantitative and qualitative) 
measures of social capital, we analyze the determinants of individual stock of social 
capital, considering individual (i.e., socio-demographic characteristics) and aggregate 
(i.e., economic development and quality of institutions) factors alike. The results 
confirm the gap in the stock of social capital between developed Western countries 
and the formerly communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The existence 
of such a gap was highlighted by Paldam and Svendsen (2000) and Adam et al. (2004) 
who attribute it to the legacy of communism. Additionally, the analysis presented here 
reveals that while the stock of social capital at the individual level is affected by very 
similar factors in both groups of countries, the differences in individual-level 
determinants cannot fully account for the variation at the aggregate level. Once we 
include aggregate measures of economic development and quality of institutions, 
however, the gap disappears. This finding thus indicates that the low average stock of 
social capital in Central and Eastern European countries can be attributed to the lower 
level of economic development and the lower quality of institutions in the new 
member countries. With respect to the latter, the effect of corruption seems to be 
particularly important.  
Although a convergence in formal institutions between the old and the new 
member states has to a large extent been accomplished (largely as a prerequisite of 
their accession to the EU), there remains a mismatch between these ‘harmonized’ 
formal institutions and the existing informal institutions in the new member countries 
(see Pejovich, 2003, for a broader discussion). This lack of correspondence, embodied 
in the prevalence of corruption and other predatory activities, may be the underlying 
reason for the gap in social capital. This argument can be reinforced by our finding 
that the participation in Olsonian groups (formal political groups and parties or 
unions) is much lower than in Putnamesque groups in the new member countries, 
reflecting the individuals’ lack of trust in formal institutions. In this respect, we agree 
with previous research that argues that social capital (i.e., voluntary participation in 
organizations) is not merely dependent on individuals’ wealth, education or particular 
interests but also on the cultural and institutional arrangements defined at the national 
level (Schofer and Fourcade-Gourinchas, 2001).  
The enlargement of the European Union is expected to foster democracy and 
encourage adoption of sound economic policies in the new member countries. This   22
will, in turn, discourage rent-seeking, motivate a rewarding scheme of leaderships 
based on performance, enhance public trust in state’s actions and promote civic spirit. 
All this should diminish the inherited ‘negative’ social capital and encourage 
formation of ‘positive’ social capital. Thus, once Central and Eastern European 
countries catch up with the West in terms of economic development and institutions, 
they are very likely to close the gap in social capital as well. For this to be possible, 
however, a gradual harmonization of formal rules and informal norms between the 
two groups of countries should be of primary importance.    23
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Table 1: Alternative measures of social capital 
Average Participation  Olson Groups  Putnam Groups  Trust  WVS90  WVS96 
Sweden  2.00 Sweden  1.00 Netherlands  1.08 Sweden  66.10  56.59 
Denmark  1.78 Denmark  0.79 Sweden  1.00 Finland  62.72  47.92 
Netherlands  1.70 Netherlands  0.62 Denmark  0.99 Denmark  57.66  
Finland  1.24 Finland  0.44 N.  Ireland  0.81 Netherlands  53.47  
Luxembourg  1.03 Luxembourg  0.34 Finland  0.80 Ireland  47.37  
Czech Rep.  0.94 
EU-OM 
Average  0.28  Ireland 0.74  Great  Britain  43.68  29.09 
Germany  West  0.93 Austria  0.25 Germany  West  0.73 N.  Ireland  43.62  
EU-OM 
Average 0.91  Great Britain  0.22  Czech Rep.  0.73 
EU-OM 
Average 41.16  37.74 
N.  Ireland  0.90 Czech  Rep.  0.21 Luxembourg  0.69 Germany  West  37.86  39.92 
Great  Britain  0.88 Slovakia  0.20 Great  Britain  0.67 Italy  35.30  
Austria  0.88 Cyprus  0.20 Slovakia  0.66 Poland  34.51  16.91 
Slovakia 0.86  Germany  West  0.19  EU Average  0.64  Spain 34.24  28.65 
Ireland  0.84 Belgium  0.17 Austria  0.63 Belgium  33.50  
Belgium  0.73 Turkey  0.15 Malta  0.57 Austria  31.82  
Cyprus  0.72 Slovenia  0.14 Slovenia  0.56 Lithuania  30.80  21.31 
Slovenia  0.70 Malta  0.13 Belgium  0.56 Bulgaria  30.40  23.69 
Malta 0.69  CC Average  0.12  Cyprus  0.53 Czech  Rep.  30.25  
France  0.58 Germany  East  0.12 Estonia  0.48 Estonia  27.58  21.06 
Estonia  0.57 France  0.10 France  0.48 Germany  East  25.60  24.28 
EU-NM 
Average 0.55  Hungary 0.10 
EU-NM 
Average 0.42  Hungary 24.59   
Germany East  0.54  Estonia  0.10  Germany East  0.42 
EU-NM  
Average  23.96 18.28 
Italy  0.49 Ireland  0.10 Italy  0.40 Slovakia  23.01  
Lithuania  0.48 N.  Ireland  0.10 Lithuania  0.39 France  22.79  
Latvia  0.47 Italy  0.09 Latvia  0.38 Portugal  21.67  
Turkey  0.43 Latvia  0.09 Hungary  0.30 Latvia  19.05  23.92 
Hungary  0.40 Lithuania  0.09 Spain  0.29 Slovenia  17.39  15.54 
Poland  0.35 Romania  0.08 Portugal  0.29 Romania  16.07  
Spain  0.35 Poland  0.07 Poland  0.28 Turkey  9.98  5.50 
Portugal  0.34 Spain  0.06 Turkey  0.28 Cyprus       28
Greece  0.31 Greece  0.05 Greece  0.26 Greece     
Romania  0.29 Portugal  0.05 Romania  0.21 Luxembourg     
Bulgaria  0.18 Bulgaria  0.05 Bulgaria  0.13 Malta       29
Table 1 (continued)  
Network: Depressed  Network: Job  Network: Money  Altruism: Money  Altruism: Time 
Ireland  0.93 Ireland  0.86 Ireland  0.91 N.  Ireland  1.29 Romania  0.67 
Netherlands  0.92 Spain  0.80 Spain  0.91 Malta  1.22 Cyprus  0.64 
Spain  0.92 Netherlands  0.79 Sweden  0.90 Ireland  1.17 Luxembourg  0.56 
Sweden  0.91 Luxembourg  0.74 Netherlands  0.88 Netherlands  1.09 Finland  0.55 
Denmark 0.90  Denmark  0.74  Denmark  0.87 Romania  1.08 Netherlands  0.54 
Slovakia  0.90 Austria  0.74 N.  Ireland  0.85 Cyprus  0.93 Ireland  0.51 
N. Ireland  0.89  N. Ireland  0.74  Finland  0.84  Luxembourg  0.93  Slovenia  0.50 
Great  Britain  0.88 Portugal  0.73 Italy  0.82 Great  Britain  0.92 Turkey  0.49 
France  0.87 Great  Britain  0.72 Czech  Rep.  0.80 Italy  0.92 Austria  0.49 
Czech Rep.  0.86  Slovenia  0.72 
EU-OM 
Average 0.80  Poland 0.89  Hungary  0.43 
EU-OM 
Average 0.86  Italy  0.70 France  0.79 Lithuania  0.89 N.  Ireland  0.42 
Luxembourg 0.86 
EU-OM 
Average 0.70  Slovakia 0.79  Spain  0.87  Poland  0.40 
Italy 0.85  France  0.69  Slovenia  0.79  EU Average  0.84 
EU-OM 
Average  0.40 
Finland  0.85 Czech  Rep.  0.67 Portugal  0.79 Finland  0.84 
EU-NM 
Average 0.39 
Austria  0.84 Sweden  0.66 Great  Britain  0.79 Turkey  0.82 Italy  0.39 
Malta  0.84 Belgium  0.65 Luxembourg  0.78 Greece  0.82 Greece  0.38 
Portugal 0.84  Hungary  0.63  Estonia 0.77  Austria 0.78  Malta  0.38 
Poland  0.83 Finland  0.61 Poland  0.76 France  0.75 Portugal  0.37 
Belgium  0.81 Germany  West  0.61 Austria  0.76 Sweden  0.74 Lithuania  0.35 
Germany West  0.80  Cyprus  0.59  Hungary  0.73 
EU-NM 
Average  0.73  Latvia 0.34 
Hungary  0.80 Greece  0.56 Greece  0.70 Denmark  0.72 Belgium  0.33 
Slovenia 0.78  Germany  East  0.54 
EU-NM 
Average  0.70  Slovenia 0.70  Spain  0.33 
Germany  East  0.78 Poland  0.53 Lithuania  0.68 Portugal  0.66 Great  Britain  0.32 
EU-NM 
Average 0.78 
EU-NM 
Average 0.53  Romania 0.68  Belgium  0.65  Germany  East  0.32 
Estonia  0.77 Slovakia  0.51 Germany  West  0.68 Hungary  0.65 Denmark  0.31 
Lithuania 0.77  Lithuania  0.50  Bulgaria 0.67  Germany  East  0.60  Germany  West  0.31   30
Romania  0.73 Malta  0.50 Belgium  0.66 Latvia  0.59 France  0.30 
Turkey 0.71  Estonia  0.49  Cyprus  0.65 Germany  West  0.57 Sweden  0.30 
Latvia  0.71 Turkey  0.48 Germany  East  0.62 Slovakia  0.52 Slovakia  0.26 
Bulgaria  0.70 Romania  0.45 Latvia  0.60 Czech  Rep.  0.45 Estonia  0.22 
Cyprus  0.70 Latvia  0.40 Turkey  0.58 Estonia  0.41 Czech  Rep.  0.20 
Greece  0.69 Bulgaria  0.37 Malta  0.56 Bulgaria  0.32 Bulgaria  0.16 
Notes:  
Average participation is the average number of voluntary organizations in which respondents actively participate. Putnam groups are charities, religious organizations, 
cultural or artistic organizations, youth organizations, sports clubs and associations, hobby clubs, and other clubs or organizations. Olsonian groups are trade unions or 
political parties, human rights movements or organizations, organizations for the protections of nature, animals and the environment, and consumer organizations. The 
maximum possible value is 11 for average participation, 7 for Putnam groups and 4 for Olson groups. Network variables take the value of one if the respondents feel she has 
someone (besides the members of her immediate household) to rely on when feeling depressed, in need of a new job for herself or a family member, or to borrow money 
urgently, and zero otherwise. Altruism variables measure whether the respondent contributed money or gave up some of her time during the preceding 12 months to help poor 
or socially excluded people. It takes values of 0 (never), 1 (less than once a month) and 2 (more than once a month). These variables are based on the following surveys: 
EB50.1 (1998) for average participation, EB56.1 (2001) for networks, EB52.1 (1999) for altruism, and CCEB 2002.1 for all three types of variables for the new member 
countries. See the text for further details and the precise wording of the relevant questions. We are grateful to the Gallup Organisation Europe for kindly making these data 
available to us. 
Trust is based on the World Value Surveys rounds of 1990 and 1996-97. The numbers correspond to the fraction of the respondents who declare that most people can be 
trusted. Blank cell indicates that the country did not participate in that survey round and therefore no data are available.    31
Table 2: Correlation matrix with alternative measures of social capital  
 
Average 
Participation 
Olson 
Groups 
Putnam 
Groups 
Network: 
Depressed 
Network: 
Job 
Network: 
Money 
Altruism: 
Money 
Altruism: 
Time 
Trust 
(WVS90) 
Olson Groups  0.937            
Putnam Groups  0.949  0.779          
Network: Depressed  0.594  0.443  0.665        
Network: Job  0.451 0.297 0.543  0.753           
Network: Money  0.529 0.452 0.539  0.792  0.742         
Altruism: Money  0.145 0.039 0.228  0.295  0.373  0.167       
Altruism: Time  0.059 0.047 0.067  -0.108  0.204  -0.022  0.649     
Trust (WVS90)  0.804 0.748 0.767  0.653  0.463 0.671 0.309 0.014   
Trust (WVS96)  0.836  0.790  0.805 0.624 0.344 0.566 0.038  -0.088  0.915 
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Table 3: Individual determinants of civic participation in new member countries 
  Overall Civic 
Participation  std. error  Putnam 
Groups  std. error  Olsonian 
Groups  std. error 
Female -0.275***  (0.049) -0.258*** (0.052) -0.200***  (0.073)
Married -0.131**  (0.059) -0.173*** (0.063) 0.082  (0.091)
Age 0.013  (0.010) -0.011 (0.010) 0.086***  (0.017)
Age  squared  -0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0007*** (0.0002)
Children -0.022  (0.025) -0.022 (0.027) -0.038  (0.039)
HH Size  -0.030  (0.024) -0.019 (0.026) -0.060  (0.037)
Secondary 0.297***  (0.081) 0.286*** (0.087) 0.426***  (0.141)
University 0.763***  (0.090) 0.717*** (0.096) 0.873***  (0.149)
Student 1.225***  (0.139) 1.355*** (0.145) 0.668***  (0.245)
Self-employed 0.214*  (0.116) 0.404*** (0.121) -0.077  (0.155)
White collar  0.123*  (0.075) 0.190** (0.080) 0.050  (0.099)
House person  -0.439***  (0.117) -0.146 (0.122) -1.177***  (0.229)
Unemployed   -0.424***  (0.114) -0.296** (0.123) -0.613***  (0.185)
Retiree -0.358***  (0.095) 0.018 (0.100) -1.050***  (0.149)
Farmer/fisherman -0.191  (0.206) 0.023 (0.230) -0.329  (0.311)
UE History: 1  -0.359***  (0.083) -0.303*** (0.088) -0.297**  (0.124)
UE History: 2+  -0.258**  (0.107) -0.137 (0.111) -0.446***  (0.180)
HH Income 2nd Quartile  0.103  (0.080) 0.077 (0.085) 0.186  (0.131)
HH Income 3rd Quartile  0.313***  (0.082) 0.254*** (0.087) 0.315**  (0.132)
HH Income 4th Quartile  0.378***  (0.089) 0.359*** (0.094) 0.263*  (0.143)
Small/Medium town  -0.093  (0.058) -0.132** (0.061) -0.003  (0.086)
City -0.350***  (0.064) -0.347*** (0.068) -0.258***  (0.098)
Cyprus 1.632***  (0.149) 1.881*** (0.166) 1.104***  (0.212)
Czech Rep.  1.924***  (0.131) 2.141*** (0.150) 1.185***  (0.185)
Estonia 1.124***  (0.130) 1.425*** (0.150) 0.312  (0.196)
Hungary 0.998***  (0.130) 1.168*** (0.150) 0.680***  (0.186)
Latvia 1.044***  (0.127) 1.317*** (0.149) 0.330*  (0.196)
Lithuania 1.100***  (0.133) 1.392*** (0.154) 0.128  (0.210)
Malta 1.605***  (0.163) 1.968*** (0.178) 0.874***  (0.244)
Poland 0.522***  (0.123) 0.748*** (0.145) 0.164  (0.185)
Romania 0.425***  (0.134) 0.531*** (0.160) 0.230  (0.198)
Slovakia 2.047***  (0.127) 2.276*** (0.145) 1.296***  (0.182)
Slovenia 1.501***  (0.126) 1.704*** (0.147) 0.800***  (0.186)
Log likelihood  -7,596.218  -6,625.982 -3273.130 
Pseudo R2  0.080  0.084 0.082 
Wald χ
2  1224.67*** 1,093.05*** 562.47*** 
No. of observations  8,899  8,901 8,899 
Notes: Estimated with ordered logit; Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Civic participation is 
measured as active participation in voluntary organizations (see the text for precise wording of the question and 
list of organizations). Putnam groups are charities, religious organizations, cultural or artistic organizations, 
youth organizations, sports clubs and associations, hobby clubs, and other clubs or organizations. Olsonian 
groups are trade unions or political parties, human rights movements or organizations, organizations for the 
protections of nature, animals and the environment, and consumer organizations.  
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Table 4: Individual determinants of civic participation in old member countries 
  Overall Civic 
Participation  std. error  Putnam 
Groups  std. error  Olsonian 
Groups  std. error 
Female  -0.242*** (0.041) -0.215*** (0.042) -0.166*** (0.054)
Married  0.020 (0.050) -0.022 (0.050) 0.228*** (0.070)
Age  0.041*** (0.007) 0.022*** (0.008) 0.081*** (0.012)
Age  squared  -0.0004*** (0.0001) -0.0002** (0.0001) -0.0008*** (0.0001)
Children  -0.031 (0.031) -0.071** (0.032) 0.120*** (0.044)
HH  Size  0.027 (0.022) 0.074*** (0.023) -0.159*** (0.035)
Secondary  0.291*** (0.057) 0.261*** (0.059) 0.328*** (0.082)
University  0.837*** (0.064) 0.728*** (0.067) 0.789*** (0.088)
Student  1.015*** (0.098) 1.153*** (0.104) 0.355*** (0.143)
Self-employed  -0.140 (0.090) 0.120 (0.089) -0.649*** (0.123)
White  collar  0.090 (0.059) 0.116* (0.061) -0.037 (0.074)
House  person  -0.199*** (0.080) 0.034 (0.081) -0.690*** (0.113)
Unemployed    -0.165* (0.090) -0.020 (0.092) -0.332*** (0.123)
Retiree  -0.095 (0.081) 0.164* (0.085) -0.521*** (0.112)
Farmer/fisherman  0.291** (0.150) 0.407*** (0.163) 0.096 (0.217)
HH  Income  2nd  Quartile 0.249*** (0.060) 0.195*** (0.062) 0.269*** (0.084)
HH Income 3rd Quartile  0.649***  (0.064) 0.551*** (0.065) 0.644***  (0.091)
HH  Income  4th  Quartile  0.756*** (0.069) 0.636*** (0.071) 0.723*** (0.098)
Denmark  1.716*** (0.110) 0.952*** (0.113) 1.991*** (0.149)
Germany  West  0.552*** (0.112) 0.645*** (0.113) 0.109 (0.165)
Greece  -0.979*** (0.124) -0.914*** (0.127) -0.933*** (0.208)
Italy  -0.415*** (0.129) -0.361*** (0.131) -0.409** (0.206)
Spain  -0.697*** (0.134) -0.681*** (0.138) -0.722*** (0.226)
France  -0.285*** (0.115) -0.173 (0.118) -0.584*** (0.182)
Ireland  0.520*** (0.131) 0.657*** (0.135) -0.126 (0.207)
N-Ireland  0.501*** (0.177) 0.637*** (0.182) -0.233 (0.273)
Luxembourg  0.747*** (0.152) 0.537*** (0.146) 0.929*** (0.215)
Netherlands  1.753*** (0.112) 1.307*** (0.113) 1.753*** (0.154)
Portugal  -0.688*** (0.128) -0.602*** (0.132) -0.950*** (0.221)
Great  Britain  0.817*** (0.123) 0.736*** (0.124) 0.665*** (0.170)
Germany  East  -0.202* (0.113) -0.131 (0.116) -0.457*** (0.177)
Finland  1.143*** (0.108) 0.702*** (0.112) 1.455*** (0.149)
Sweden  2.073*** (0.143) 0.984*** (0.150) 2.620*** (0.184)
Austria  0.478*** (0.119) 0.408*** (0.119) 0.513*** (0.168)
Log likelihood  -1,1367.22  -10,210.34 -5,870.042 
Pseudo R2  0.127  0.081 0.198 
Wald χ
2  2,923.19*** 1,568.99*** 2,273.74 
No. of observations  10,699  10,699 10,699 
Notes: Estimated with ordered logit; Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Civic participation is 
measured as active participation in voluntary organizations (see the text for precise wording of the question and 
list of organizations). Putnam groups are charities, religious organizations, cultural or artistic organizations, 
youth organizations, sports clubs and associations, hobby clubs, and other clubs or organizations. Olsonian 
groups are trade unions or political parties, human rights movements or organizations, organizations for the 
protections of nature, animals and the environment, and consumer organizations.    34
Table 5: Individual determinants of social networks in new member countries 
  Networks if 
depressed  std. error  Networks if 
needs job  std. error  Networks to 
borrow  std. error 
Female 0.343***  (0.057) -0.119** (0.050) 0.081  (0.053)
Married 0.096  (0.070) 0.062 (0.062) 0.127*  (0.066)
Age -0.059***  (0.011) -0.065*** (0.010) -0.071***  (0.010)
Age  squared  0.0004*** -0.0001 0.0005*** -0.0001 0.0006*** -0.0001
Children 0.042  (0.027) 0.026 (0.025) 0.086***  (0.026)
HH Size  -0.156***  (0.027) -0.148*** (0.024) -0.181***  (0.025)
Secondary 0.091***  (0.079) 0.122* (0.075) 0.298***  (0.074)
University 0.275**  (0.092) 0.349*** (0.086) 0.459***  (0.087)
Student 0.385**  (0.172) 0.258* (0.146) 0.235  (0.157)
Self-employed 0.344  (0.159) 0.486*** (0.130) 0.636***  (0.161)
White collar  0.098  (0.094) 0.217*** (0.078) 0.147*  (0.088)
House person  -0.084  (0.120) -0.203* (0.109) 0.011  (0.114)
Unemployed   -0.083  (0.113) -0.255*** (0.104) -0.084  (0.106)
Retiree 0.044  (0.106) -0.052 (0.095) -0.093  (0.100)
Farmer/fisherman -0.234  (0.224) 0.193 (0.197) -0.089  (0.213)
UE History: 1  -0.169**  (0.088) -0.320*** (0.077) -0.215***  (0.084)
UE History: 2+  -0.329***  (0.117) -0.296*** (0.104) -0.438***  (0.108)
HH Income 2nd Quartile  0.244***  (0.082) 0.278*** (0.079) 0.240***  (0.078)
HH Income 3rd Quartile  0.362***  (0.087) 0.399*** (0.081) 0.420***  (0.082)
HH Income 4th Quartile  0.621***  (0.098) 0.866*** (0.089) 0.749***  (0.094)
Small/Medium town  -0.064  (0.067) -0.122** (0.060) -0.141**  (0.063)
City -0.046  (0.073) -0.055 (0.066) -0.239***  (0.069)
Cyprus -0.213  (0.138) 0.814*** (0.136) -0.312**  (0.136)
Czech Rep.  0.815***  (0.147) 1.025*** (0.129) 0.339***  (0.137)
Estonia 0.030  (0.123) 0.154 (0.115) 0.162  (0.122)
Hungary 0.392***  (0.121) 1.072*** (0.112) 0.145  (0.116)
Latvia -0.191  (0.119) -0.113 (0.115) -0.536***  (0.114)
Lithuania -0.003  (0.131) 0.251** (0.123) -0.361***  (0.125)
Malta 0.750***  (0.173) 0.370** (0.154) -0.609***  (0.151)
Poland 0.629***  (0.112) 0.452*** (0.100) 0.285***  (0.105)
Romania -0.087  (0.115) 0.233** (0.113) -0.189*  (0.112)
Slovakia 1.209***  (0.154) 0.528*** (0.118) 0.447***  (0.128)
Slovenia 0.150  (0.128) 1.258*** (0.121) 0.221*  (0.126)
Constant 2.470***  (0.299) 1.386*** (0.267) 2.648***  (0.285)
Log likelihood  -4,259.41  -4,938.50 -4,646.19 
Pseudo R2  0.055  0.092 0.057 
Wald χ
2  458.86*** 859.85*** 522.32*** 
No. of observations  8,625  7,852 8,303 
Notes: Estimated with ordered logit; Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.  Networks variables take 
value 1 if the respondent can rely on other people outside their immediate household if she feels depressed, 
needs a job for herself or a family member, or needs to borrow money to pay an urgent bill.  
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Table 6: Individual determinants of social networks in old member countries 
  Networks if 
depressed  std. error  Networks if 
needs job  std. error  Networks to 
borrow  std. error 
Female  0.557*** (0.062) -0.043 (0.049) 0.191*** (0.056)
Married  -0.052 (0.068) 0.046 (0.055) -0.003 (0.062)
Age  -0.027*** (0.011) -0.039*** (0.009) -0.025*** (0.010)
Age  squared  0.0001 (0.0001) 0.0002*** (0.0001) 0.0001 (0.0001)
Secondary  0.213*** (0.076) 0.172*** (0.063) 0.093 (0.070)
University  0.396*** (0.095) 0.293*** (0.073) 0.205*** (0.084)
Student  0.713*** (0.181) 0.378*** (0.131) 0.538*** (0.157)
Self-employed  0.257* (0.146) 0.105 (0.114) 0.367*** (0.135)
White  collar  0.303*** (0.100) 0.124* (0.075) 0.268*** (0.088)
House  person  0.065 (0.124) -0.082 (0.092) 0.126 (0.107)
Unemployed    -0.272** (0.117) -0.732*** (0.094) -0.315*** (0.104)
Retiree  0.023 (0.115) -0.115 (0.090) -0.040 (0.105)
Farmer/fisherman  0.459* (0.278) -0.021 (0.215) -0.003 (0.239)
HH  Income  2nd  Quartile 0.304*** (0.081) 0.301*** (0.066) 0.225*** (0.073)
HH Income 3rd Quartile  0.391***  (0.090) 0.477*** (0.073) 0.529***  (0.084)
HH  Income  4th  Quartile  0.548*** (0.104) 0.615*** (0.080) 0.652*** (0.093)
Small/Medium  town  -0.063 (0.070) -0.140*** (0.057) -0.081 (0.064)
City  0.011 (0.077) -0.021 (0.062) 0.015 (0.070)
Denmark  0.695*** (0.162) 0.217* (0.130) 1.314*** (0.144)
Germany  West  0.084 (0.144) -0.212* (0.126) 0.264** (0.126)
Greece  -0.494*** (0.141) -0.376*** (0.129) 0.345*** (0.130)
Italy  0.293* (0.162) 0.256* (0.144) 0.957*** (0.152)
Spain  1.142*** (0.185) 0.665*** (0.144) 1.807*** (0.172)
France  0.606*** (0.160) 0.165 (0.131) 0.857*** (0.136)
Ireland  1.489*** (0.286) 0.806*** (0.187) 1.573*** (0.219)
N-Ireland  0.978*** (0.285) 0.310 (0.204) 1.344*** (0.243)
Luxembourg  0.447*** (0.182) 0.348** (0.155) 0.680*** (0.157)
Netherlands  1.228*** (0.200) 0.510*** (0.145) 1.628*** (0.175)
Portugal  0.316** (0.157) 0.473*** (0.140) 0.874*** (0.143)
Great  Britain  0.722*** (0.177) 0.326** (0.143) 0.959*** (0.150)
Germany  East  -0.024 (0.140) -0.394*** (0.124) 0.068 (0.124)
Finland  0.232 (0.150) -0.317*** (0.127) 1.156*** (0.140)
Sweden  1.079*** (0.167) 0.020 (0.125) 1.908*** (0.156)
Austria  0.062 (0.155) 0.299** (0.141) 0.486*** (0.140)
Constant  1.501*** (0.281) 1.526*** (0.231) 0.801*** (0.253)
Log likelihood  -4,001.45  -5,622.07 -4,612.88 
Pseudo R2  0.080  0.074 0.091 
Wald χ
2  626.11*** 788.80*** 808.76*** 
No. of observations  10,376  9,650 9,952 
Notes: Estimated with ordered logit; Significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%. Networks variables take 
value 1 if the respondent can rely on other people outside their immediate household if she feels depressed, 
needs a job for herself or a family member, or needs to borrow money to pay an urgent bill. 
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Table 7: Individual determinants of social capital: Pooled data  
 
Overall Civic 
Participation  std. error Putnam 
Groups  std. error Olsonian 
Groups  std. error  Networks if 
depressed  std. error Networks if 
needs job  std. error Networks 
to borrow  std. error
Female -0.240***  (0.030) -0.202*** (0.035) -0.145*** (0.041) 0.421*** (0.040) -0.077*** (0.033) 0.167*** (0.037)
Married 0.071**  (0.036) 0.111*** (0.042) 0.336*** (0.052) -0.055 (0.046) -0.008 (0.038) 0.016 (0.042)
Age 0.034***  (0.006) 0.031*** (0.007) 0.091*** (0.010) -0.033*** (0.007) -0.043*** (0.006) -0.038*** (0.007)
Age squared  -0.0003***  (0.0001) -0.0003*** (0.0001) -0.0008*** (0.0001) 0.0002*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001)
Children 0.040***  (0.016) 0.036** (0.019) 0.146*** (0.023)
HH Size  -0.063***  (0.014) -0.077*** (0.016) -0.168*** (0.020)
Secondary 0.522***  (0.043) 0.489*** (0.055) 0.635*** (0.067) 0.238*** (0.051) 0.082* (0.045) 0.189*** (0.047)
University 1.103***  (0.047) 1.063*** (0.058) 1.320*** (0.069) 0.383*** (0.059) 0.241*** (0.051) 0.401*** (0.055)
Student 1.454***  (0.074) 1.266*** (0.090) 1.094*** (0.115) 0.626*** (0.116) 0.326*** (0.092) 0.488*** (0.102)
Self-employed -0.200***  (0.069) -0.243*** (0.078) -0.618*** (0.091) 0.287*** (0.104) 0.295*** (0.084) 0.501*** (0.102)
White collar  0.120***  (0.045) 0.091* (0.051) -0.026 (0.056) 0.250*** (0.066) 0.239*** (0.052) 0.226*** (0.060)
House person  -0.338***  (0.060) -0.474*** (0.076) -0.973*** (0.094) 0.079 (0.080) -0.068 (0.064) 0.011 (0.072)
Unemployed   -0.531***  (0.064) -0.580*** (0.078) -0.673*** (0.092) -0.311*** (0.073) -0.663*** (0.063) -0.343*** (0.067)
Retiree -0.350**  (0.058) -0.387*** (0.070) -0.769*** (0.086) 0.023 (0.074) -0.079 (0.063) -0.056 (0.068)
Farmer/fisherman -0.227***  (0.108) -0.266* (0.140) -0.408*** (0.159) 0.024 (0.165) 0.038 (0.142) 0.001 (0.150)
HH Income 2nd Quartile  0.162***  (0.045) 0.158*** (0.055) 0.181*** (0.066) 0.227*** (0.055) 0.253*** (0.048) 0.228*** (0.050)
HH Income 3rd Quartile  0.314***  (0.046) 0.268*** (0.056) 0.287*** (0.067) 0.284*** (0.058) 0.370*** (0.050) 0.388*** (0.054)
HH Income 4th Quartile  0.419***  (0.050) 0.364*** (0.059) 0.320*** (0.071) 0.504*** (0.065) 0.709*** (0.054) 0.606*** (0.060)
Small/Medium town    0.000 (0.046) -0.133*** (0.039) -0.091** (0.043)
City   -0.063 (0.050) -0.099** (0.042) -0.167*** (0.046)
New members   -0.949***  (0.035) 0.258*** (0.039) -1.144*** (0.051) -0.509*** (0.039) -0.735*** (0.033) -0.440*** (0.036)
Constant   2.054*** (0.179) 1.755*** (0.151) 1.845*** (0.164)
Log likelihood  -20,527.24  -14,013.01 -10,079.12 -8,734.46 -11,075.22 -9,840.80
Pseudo R2  0.061  0.045 0.093 0.042 0.074 0.042
Wald χ
2  2,435.37***  1,274.67*** 1,716.89*** 738.56*** 1,543.71*** 790.64***
No. of observations  19,854  19,661 19,702 19,293 17,774 18531
Notes: Estimated with logit or ordered logit; Significance levels: * 5% and ** 10%.   37
Table 8: Individual and aggregate determinants of social capital: Pooled data  
 
Overall Civic 
Participation std. error  Putnam 
Groups  std. error Olsonian 
Groups  std. error Networks if 
depressed  std. error Networks if 
needs job  std. error Networks to 
borrow  std. error 
Female -0.258***  (0.055)-0.220*** (0.065) -0.195*** (0.068) 0.429***  (0.060) -0.111*** (0.036) 0.124** (0.050)
Married -0.023  (0.056) 0.011 (0.071) 0.200*** (0.066) -0.021  (0.056) -0.015 (0.037) 0.039 (0.057)
Age 0.032***  (0.007) 0.028** (0.012) 0.087*** (0.009) -0.034***  (0.008) -0.045*** (0.006) -0.039*** (0.007)
Age squared  -0.0003***  (0.0001)-0.0003** (0.0001) -0.0008*** (0.0001) 0.0002*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001) 0.0003*** (0.0001)
Children -0.030  (0.027) -0.036 (0.033) 0.060 (0.039)  
HH Size  0.036  (0.023) 0.014 (0.026) -0.073** (0.029)  
Secondary 0.333***  (0.086) 0.353*** (0.112) 0.419*** (0.096) 0.193***  (0.071) 0.042 (0.063) 0.142* (0.082)
University 0.837***  (0.090) 0.823*** (0.128) 0.908*** (0.091) 0.309***  (0.082) 0.193*** (0.067) 0.300*** (0.087)
Student 1.153***  (0.118) 0.933*** (0.225) 0.581*** (0.195) 0.520***  (0.132) 0.265* (0.137) 0.393*** (0.144)
Self-employed 0.039  (0.095) -0.064 (0.150) -0.363*** (0.136) 0.341***  (0.114) 0.299*** (0.090) 0.524*** (0.107)
White collar  0.169**  (0.068) 0.129 (0.079) 0.064 (0.073) 0.274***  (0.070) 0.248*** (0.065) 0.268*** (0.064)
House person  -0.211  (0.153) -0.394* (0.201) -0.664*** (0.247) 0.110  (0.135) 0.038 (0.095) 0.193** (0.091)
Unemployed   -0.430***  (0.079)-0.462*** (0.095) -0.563*** (0.130) -0.281***  (0.101) -0.623*** (0.081) -0.348*** (0.082)
Retiree -0.203**  (0.089) -0.244* (0.142) -0.676*** (0.170) 0.060  (0.078) -0.024 (0.075) -0.011 (0.077)
Farmer/fisherman 0.159  (0.248) 0.058 (0.261) -0.070 (0.325) 0.039 (0.183) 0.108 (0.144) -0.006 (0.157)
HH Income 2nd Quartile  0.146*  (0.072) 0.128 (0.091) 0.167** (0.082) 0.182***  (0.064) 0.217*** (0.072) 0.162** (0.067)
HH Income 3rd Quartile  0.478***  (0.095) 0.426*** (0.132) 0.486*** (0.127) 0.253***  (0.082) 0.358*** (0.071) 0.340*** (0.087)
HH Income 4th Quartile  0.513***  (0.114) 0.453*** (0.151) 0.466*** (0.170) 0.446***  (0.105) 0.709*** (0.088) 0.574*** (0.107)
Small/Medium town    -0.025  (0.058) -0.129** (0.057) -0.081 (0.062)
City   -0.028  (0.065) -0.057 (0.086) -0.102 (0.074)
GDP per capita 
(thousands) 0.023  (0.024) 0.019 (0.027) 0.007 (0.022) -0.001  (0.017) 0.000 (0.018) -0.029** (0.013)
Gini coefficient   -0.049*  (0.027) -0.071** (0.034) -0.064** (0.031) -0.008  (0.022) -0.022 (0.017) -0.004 (0.020)
Non-corruption 0.249***  (0.092) 0.337*** (0.099) 0.461*** (0.108) 0.156  (0.102) 0.022 (0.104) 0.292*** (0.085)
Economic Freedom   0.422**  (0.176) 0.345* (0.195) 0.116 (0.250) -0.027  (0.155) 0.161 (0.168) -0.170 (0.139)
New members  0.942***  (0.323) 2.436*** (0.409) 0.943** (0.404) -0.042  (0.300) -0.414 (0.311) -0.220 (0.244)
Constant     1.446  (1.173) 1.131 (0.951) 1.864* (0.957)
F-statistics 12.88***  19.01*** 36.11*** 21.91*** 71.25*** 14.76***
No. of observations  19019  18,841 18,882 18,460 17,010 17,758  38
Notes: Estimated with logit or ordered logit; Significance levels: * 5% and ** 10%. Standard errors are adjusted to account for the fact that country-level and individual 
variables are observed at different levels of aggregation. GDP per capita is in thousands of US dollars adjusted for purchasing-power parity. Non-corruption is the corruption 
perception index as compiled by Transparency International, higher values indicate less corruption. Economic freedom is the index compiled by the Frasier Institute.  
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